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Abstract 
Research on sentence consistency in England and Wales has focused on disparities between 
courts, with differences between judges largely ignored. This is largely due to the limitations in 
official data. Using text mining techniques from Crown Court sentence records available online 
we generate a sample of 7,212 violent and sexual offences where both court and judge are 
captured. Multilevel time-to-event analyses of sentence length demonstrate that most disparities 
originate at the judge, not the court-level. Two important implications follow: i) the extent of 
sentencing consistency in England and Wales has been underestimated; and ii) the importance 
attributed to the location in which sentences are passed ² in England and Wales and elsewhere - 
needs to be revisited. Further analysis of the judge level disparities identifies judicial rotation 
across courts as a practice conducive of sentence consistency, which suggests that sentencing 
guidelines could be complemented with other, less intrusive, changes in judicial practice to 
promote consistency.  
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1. Introduction 
Consistency in sentencing is a central principle to criminal justice in common law systems. 
Loosely understood, this principle invokes that only relevant factors should influence the 
sentence outcome, and that the approach taken in considering those factors ought to show a 
degree of stability within a given jurisdiction. A system unable to uphold this principle would 
struggle to ensure equality before the law or to maintain that the punishment fits the crime, two 
additional key principles lying at the core of most criminal justice systems. From a more 
instrumental point of view, promoting consistency in sentencing tackles the ¶generation of 
unwarranted disparities·. Unlike legitimate variations in sentencing, which reflect meaningful case 
or offender differences, unwarranted disparities are rooted in unjustified discrepant approaches 
to sentencing (Stolzenberg, L., D'Alessio, 1994; Pina-Sánchez and Linacre, 2016). They can take 
the form of anything from discriminatory practices against ethnic minorities (see for example 
Albonetti, 2002; Bushway and Piehl, 2001; Hood, 1992; King and Johnson, 2016) to more 
random but similarly illegitimate disparities (see Chen et al., 2016; Danziger et al., 2011; Eren and 
Mocan, 2016; Heyes and Saberian, 2018; where factors such as the weather, lunch breaks, or 
local sport results are shown to influence sentencing). Thus, the promotion of consistency helps 
to foster transparency and predictability in sentencing, which in turn increases public confidence 
in the criminal justice system (Roberts and Plesnicar, 2015). It comes as no surprise that many 
jurisdictions have taken great strides to promote consistency in sentencing. The most relevant 
experiences are those that have taken place in the United States (both at the Federal and State 
level) and the United Kingdom (separately for the jurisdictions of England and Wales, and 
Scotland), which have sought to limit unwarranted disparities by restraining judicial discretion 
through systems of sentencing guidelines.  
The relevance of the concept of sentencing disparities has been matched by the research efforts 
dedicated to its empirical exploration. However, the vast majority of studies have focused on the 
detection of specific illegitimate factors showing an undue influence in sentencing. Studies 
aiming to measure the overall level of consistency in sentencing - or equivalently, the true extent 
of unwarranted disparities - are scarcer, and have not been able to offer entirely satisfactory 
answers. Largely this is due to the difficulties at the operationalisation stage (see Cole, 1997; 
Hofer et al. 1999; Pina-Sánchez and Linacre, 2016). One of the most common approaches 
pursued in the literature to measure the extent of unwarranted disparities involves the use of 
multilevel models. This require access to individual records capturing not only details of the case 
but also identifying the hierarchical nature of sentencing (i.e. sentences clustered within judges, 
clustered within courts). When sentence data available to researchers includes the locations 
where each sentence was imposed, multilevel models have commonly been used to measure 
average disparities between areas while controlling for the different mix of cases processed in 
each of those locations. These studies have explored differences between districts (Feldmeyer 
and Ulmer, 2011; Hamilton, 2017; Johnson, et al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Schanzenbach and Tiller, 
2006; Ulmer et al., 2011; Ulmer and Johnson, 2016), counties (Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Haynes, 
2011; Hester and Sevigny, 2016; Johnson, 2005; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), or specific courts 
(Drápal, 2018; Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017, 2018a). Typically, variations in sentence length or type, 
stemming from any of the levels listed above, which cannot be explained by legitimate case 
characteristics (e.g., offence severity), are used as measures of inconsistency in sentencing. 
7KHVH VWXGLHV DUH SUHPLVHG LPSOLFLWO\ RU H[SOLFLWO\ RQ WKH ¶FRXUW FRPPXQLWLHV· SHUVSHFWLYH
(Hester, 2017). This theory views courts as communities made up of actors such as prosecutors, 
judges, defence lawyers, and court staff (Eisenstein, Flemming and Nardulli 1988; Flemming, 
Nardulli and Eisenstein 1992; Ulmer 1997). Interdependent working relationships emerge 
between these actors - WKH ¶FRXUWURRP ZRUNJURXS· (LVHQVWHLQ DQG -DFREV  ² which 
SURGXFHDGLVWLQFWVRFLDORUGHURU¶ORFDOOHJDOFXOWXUH·&KXUFKWKDWXOWLPDWHO\VKDSHVFDVH
processing and decision-making. The way that the courtroom workgroup functions - and thus, 
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the way a specific culture is formed - is influenced by workgroup interactions (e.g., attitudes, 
SUHIHUHQFHV IDPLOLDULW\ RI PHPEHUV DV ZHOO DV HQYLURQPHQWDO IDFWRUV VXFK DV HDFK PHPEHU·V
sponsoring organization and the social, economic, or political features of the local court 
community (Nardulli, Eisenstein, and Flemming, 1988; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). According to 
WKLV SHUVSHFWLYH VHQWHQFLQJ GLVSDULWLHV DUH URRWHG LQ WKH XQLTXH DWWULEXWHV RI HDFK ORFDWLRQ·V
respective culture.  
The importance placed on location in examining and explaining sentencing consistency has been 
particularly strong in England and Wales. In this jurisdiction, the principle of consistency is 
largely interpreted as the absence of between court disparities. This was nowhere better reflected 
than by Lord Levenson, chairman of the Sentencing Council for England and Wales at the time 
its first guideline was introduced. In an interview to the BBC Lord Levenson stated, ´>«@WKHDLP
[of the new assault guideline] is to increase the consistency of approach to sentencing so that offenders receive the 
VDPH DSSURDFK ZKHWKHU WKH\·UH EHLQJ VHQWHQFHG LQ %ULVWRO %LUPLQJKDP %ROWRQ RU %DVLOGRQµ5. Similar 
interpretations have been made by other government bodies, think tanks6, and recent empirical 
research undertaken in this jurisdiction. Using multilevel modelling and Sentencing Council data 
capturing court locations Pina-Sánchez and Linacre (2013) sought to estimate the level of 
consistency in sentencing in the Crown Court. Pina-Sánchez and Grech (2017) tested whether 
court and area characteristics could be behind the observed disparities between courts. Pina-
Sánchez et al. (2018a) expanded this work by looking at disparities arising throughout the 
sequence of steps listed in the sentencing guidelines in England and Wales. Pina-Sánchez (2015) 
estimated changes in between court disparities following the introduction of the new assault 
guideline, while Pina-Sánchez et al. (2017) looked at similar changes following the 2011 summer 
riots. With the exception of Pina-Sánchez et al. (2017), this body of work points at between 
court disparities in the Crown Court being relatively negligible, which has been interpreted as 
evidence of high levels of consistency in sentencing.  
Such a concluVLRQLVSUREOHPDWLFVLQFHHYHQLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIFRPSOH[¶FRXUWFXOWXUHV·WKHILQDO
sentence is up to the discretion of individual judges. Nevertheless, this crucial level of analysis 
has been ignored in previous multi-level analyses of sentence data in England and Wales. The 
importance of having missed judge-level disparities cannot be overstated. Nearly a half-century 
ago Hogarth (1971) famously concluded that, ´RQHFDQH[SODLQPRUHDERXWVHQWHQFLQJE\NQRZLQJDIHZ
things about a judge than by knowing D JUHDW GHDO DERXW WKH IDFWV RI WKH FDVHµ (1971: 350), with much 
subsequent research highlighting the importance of examining these actors more closely when 
trying to explain unwarranted variations in sentencing (see for example, Croyle, 1983; Divine, 
2018; Long and Burnham, 2012; Ulmer, 2012; Yang, 2014, 2015; Zatz, 2000).    
7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIH[DPLQLQJWKHMXGJH·VUROHLVKLJKOLJKWHGE\WKH¶IRFDOFRQFHUQV·SHUVSHFWLYH
which views sentencing as a process based on three primary concerns: blameworthiness, 
protection of the public, and practical constraints (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000, 2001; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer and Johnson 2004). Judges are said to 
XVH¶SHUFHSWXDOVKRUWKDQG·(Hawkins, 1981) when assessing these concerns, relying on legitimate 
offender/offence characteristics as well as non-legal contextual factors, due to a lack of time, 
resources, and complete background information. Other important judge characteristics that 
have been shown to lead to between judge disparities in sentencing are gender (Steffensmeier 
and Hebert, 1999), or time on the bench (Spohn, 1990b), with female and more experienced 
judges shown to sentence more harshly.  
                                                          
5 The newsletter can be downloaded from this link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12681250.   
6
 See the Howard League for Penal Reform (2013) press release as reproduced here, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22243680, or Mason et al. (2008) from the Ministry of Justice, where the focus 
lies on Police Force Areas. 
4 
 
From a methodological standpoint, if disparities originating at the judge level are statistically 
significant over and above the noted between court disparities, then measures of consistency in 
sentencing limited to the latter will be biased upwards. That is, it is likely that previous studies ² 
such as the recent work stemming from England and Wales - have overestimated the true extent 
of sentence consistency or underestimated the true extent of sentence disparities. Evidence 
supporting this hypothesis can be found in Johnson (2006, 2014) and Yang (2014). Using data 
from Pennsylvania and federal district courts the author specified various multilevel models 
accounting for court and judge disparities simultaneously. In all the models presented, between 
judge disparities were found significant. For example, looking at sentence length for cases that 
went to trial Johnson (2014) showed disparities at the judge level to be roughly four times larger 
than the disparities observed at the court level.  
As far as we are aware, Johnson (2006, 2014) and Yang (2014) represent the only studies where 
between court and judge disparities have been modelled simultaneously7. We argue that this is 
due to the well-documented reticence of the judiciary towards independent research (Ashworth, 
2003; Baldwin, 2008; Darbyshire, 2011; Dhami and Souza, 2010; King, 2017; Tata, 2013; Ulmer, 
2012), which is manifested in limitations to the recording and publication of official sentence 
data. This is well illustrated by the case of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC), where researchers based at Syracuse University spent decades in legal disputes before 
they were able to obtain data identifying the judge who passed each sentence8.  
Judges have argued that the release of sentencing data could simplify a complex decision-making 
process that cannot be fully captured quantitatively (Gertner, 2012), as well as compromise 
judicial independence by drawing judges into policy debates that should be left to executive and 
legislative branches9. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, who served on the Supreme Court of the 
8QLWHG 6WDWHV IRU  \HDUV ZHQW DV IDU DV WR VD\ WKDW FROOHFWLQJ GDWD RQ MXGJHV· VHQWHQFLQJ
practices ´FRXOGDPRXQWWRDQXQZDUUDQWHGDQGLOO-FRQVLGHUHGHIIRUWWRLQWLPLGDWHLQGLYLGXDOMXGJHVµand would 
"seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and reasonable sentences"10. Whilst these concerns are 
undoubtedly important, they must be considered alongside the significant impact that refusal to 
provide this data has had on our understanding of sentencing disparities. Often the only viable 
alternative to the use of official sentencing data is to undertake primary data collection, which 
requires extraordinary efforts and resources to achieve large enough samples.  
Here we suggest an alternative approach to access the necessary data based on text mining 
sentence records available online. We download and code a sample of 7,221 violent and sexual 
LQWHUSHUVRQDO RIIHQFH UHFRUGV IURP ¶7KH /DZ 3DJHV· DQ RQOLQH FDVH ODZ GDWDEDVH IURP WKH
England and Wales Crown Court. This is a commercial website used by legal practitioners to 
follow the development of relevant cases, and by members of the general public interested in 
KLULQJ OHJDO VHUYLFHV 7KH ZHEVLWH·V DUFKLYH LV XSGDWHG GDLO\ LQFOXGLQJ H[FHUSWV IURP VHQWHQFH
transcripts, certain case characteristics, and crucially, the name of the judge who passed the 
sentence and the court where the trial took place. We use this new data to estimate and compare 
the extent of sentencing disparities stemming from the court and judge level in the Crown Court. 
This allows us to obtain new measures of sentence consistency, test the validity of the 
conclusions from previous research, and assess the presence of WKH¶FRXUWFXOWXUH·SKHQRPHQRQ
in the England and Wales Crown Court.  
                                                          
7 There are other articles where judge and court identifiers were available but they were modelled separately, or 
simply controlled for using fixed effects, see for example Chatsverykova (2016), Myers and Talarico (1987), Lim 
(2016), Volkov (2016) or any of the reports from the US Sentencing Commission, such as Saris et al. (2012). 
8 These legal disputes are described in detail here: http://trac.syr.edu/judges/aboutData.html 
9 See https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/nyregion/wide-sentencing-disparity-found-among-us-judges.html 
10 See https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/08/07/ashcroft-orders-tally-of-lighter-
sentences/06d0c1f5-0995-441b-9bfe-cd3b0c9639fb/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bf667353be9f 
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Beyond obtaining specific measurements of between judge disparities, this new dataset offers a 
unique opportunity to delve into the origin of such disparities. We do so by exploring two 
unique features of the Crown Court: the variety of judges operating within it, and the practice of 
judicial rotation. Judicial rotation is a common practice amongst recorders and circuit judges, 
who represent 50% of the judges in England and Wales. Importantly, recent qualitative evidence 
suggests that the practice of rotation might contribute to foster consistency in sentencing. 
Specifically, Hester (2017) suggests that the limited sentencing disparities detected in South 
Carolina (Hester, 2012; Hester and Sevigny, 2016) may be rooted in their practice of rotating 
judges between courts, which facilitates the spread of norms and encourages judges to 
harmonize their sentencing practices. Hence, accounting for the identity of the judge responsible 
for each sentenced case becomes essential to ensure accurate estimations of consistency, while 
allowing us to explore the role that different types of judges, and the practice of judicial rotation 
more generally, might have as a buffer or catalyst of unwarranted disparities.  
In the next section we outline the nature of the data source and the process undertaken to code 
it into a series of relevant variables. This is followed by the analytical strategy, where the need for 
an innovative cross-classified multilevel model differentiating between court and judge disparities 
that can also account for judicial rotation is explained. The results from our analyses of 
disparities in sentence length are presented in Section 4. Their implications are discussed in 
Section 5, followed by a rebuttal of the arguments used by the judiciary to censor their sentence 
records, and an outline of the new avenues of research that text mining techniques have opened 
in the field of sentencing. 
 
2. Data 
A number of online databases are available to legal practitioners to research existing case law, 
including the British and Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII) and Westlaw. However, 
these databases tend to focus on highly significant cases, sentenced in special courts like the 
Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, and as such they are not representative of the average 
sentencing process in England and Wales. Recently, however, a commercial website under the 
domain www.thelawpages.com has been making available information from more common 
offences sentenced in the Crown Court on a daily basis. Records from this archive, however, can 
only be accessed individually and much of the relevant information is not available in a way that 
can be easily transformed into variables amenable to statistical analysis.  
We used data scraping techniques to generate an initial database of 18,220 cases that were 
sentenced in the England and Wales Crown Court between 2007 and 2017. Each sentence 
record was loaded in a browser using Perl and Selenium with relevant case characteristics 
automatically extracted and compiled. Special care was taken not to overload ¶7he Law Pages· 
server in the case that it could become slow or unresponsive. For this reason HTTP requests 
were programmed to occur every minute. Once loaded, the HTML source code was saved 
locally. A parser, written in Perl then looked for specific keywords within the HTML source 
code, from which relevant variables could be systematically recorded. A number of relevant case 
characteristics were extracted directly from the source code following this approach (e.g. 
sentence outcome, type of offence, and age of the defendant).  
Variables relating to judge characteristics were generated using a second stage text mining 
process that focused specifically on WKHMXGJH·VWLWOHDQGQDPH Clauses including ¶Miss·, ¶Ms·, and 
¶Her· were extracted from the judges title in order to approximate WKH MXGJHV· JHQGHU The 
position of the judge was also approximated by extracting and analysing specific clauses in their 
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title.11 Here we distinguish Recorders, 4XHHQ·V&RXQVHO MXGJHV (identified with the SUHIL[¶QC·) 
Circuit judges, LGHQWLILHGXVLQJ¶++-·¶+HU+RQRXU·DQG¶+LV+RQRXU·DQG High Court judges 
(using the clauses ¶Justice· and ¶Honourable·). The categories generated can be taken as proxies 
for seniority, with recorders working part-time and often representing the first step on the 
judicial ladder to appointment to the circuit bench H[FHSW ZKHQ WKH WLWOH LV XVHG DV ´7KH
recorder of [Crown Court location]µZKHUHLVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHPRVWVHQLRUjudge in that court). 
Circuit judges comprise the biggest bulk of the judiciary in the Crown Court and generally handle 
more serious or complex cases relative to recorders. Finally, High Court judges represent the 
most senior group of judges, dealing with more complex and difficult cases. This classification is, 
however, far from perfect. There are other characteristics besides seniority captured by those 
judicial titles (for example, QC refer to special appointments that can overlap with the three titles 
listed above). More importantly, the full title of the judge was only reported in 21.7% of cases. 
Those for which only the name of the judge was available are used as the reference category in 
our analysis, under the assumption that they are Circuit judges, the most common category in the 
Crown Court. 
 
2.1. Current Study 
This text mining process resulted in the extraction of a total of 52 variables relating to the case, 
defendant and judge. Two of these refer to the sentence outcome ² the length of the prison 
sentence in months, and whether sentenced to life imprisonment. Two are basic defendant 
characteristics - age and gender. Seven relate to characteristics of the sentencing judge, including 
their position, gender, and whether they were found to rotate across different courts. Nine cover 
general case characteristics, capturing the year when the sentence was passed, the presence of co-
defendants, whether multiple offences were considered, or a guilty plea entered before trial, the 
presence of mitigating factors, whether there was a victim impact statement, injuries were caused, 
and whether the offender was sentenced to remand or a public protection sentence,. Lastly, we 
were able to differentiate between 32 specific offence types.  
For the analyses presented here we make use of a subsample of 7,221 violent and sexual 
interpersonal offences sentenced to prison in the Crown Court from 2007 to 2017. The focus on 
a broadly similar group of offences limits the possibility of omitted relevant variable bias, which 
is useful given the difficulty of capturing the full list of relevant case characteristics in analyses of 
sentence data (Anderson et al., 1999; Brantingham, 1985; Hofer et al., 1999; Waldfogel, 1998). In 
addition, to avoid over-fitting the model and incurring problems of multicollinearity, some of the 
offence types are grouped together. This process was based on similarities between offence types 
in their legal definition but also on preliminary analyses of the effect they have on the final 
VHQWHQFH )RU H[DPSOH RIIHQFHV FRGHG DV ¶XQODZIXO ZRXQGLQJ·, ¶JULHYRXV ERGLO\ KDUP· and 
¶FRQVSLUDF\ WR FRPPLW JULHYRXV ERGLO\ KDUP· were grouped into the same category. Table 1 
shows descriptive statistics for all the variables that are used in the analyses presented in the next 
section. 
 
2.2. External Validity 
The generalisability of the sample generated is unknown. ¶The /DZ 3DJHV· does not provide 
information on their website about the sampling methods used, and they have not replied to our 
                                                          
11
 The different titles used in England and Wales to distinguish members of the judiciary are listed in the judiciary 
website (https://www.judiciary.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/what-do-i-call-judge/) where their seniority is also 
described (https://www.judiciary.uk/about-the-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/judicial-roles/judges/). 
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queries on this matter. Nevertheless, examination of the locations of the courts where sentences 
were passed reveals a good geographical spread across the England and Wales Crown Court 
locations, with the exception of the Central Criminal Court, which is overrepresented 
(comprising 9% of the extracted cases, compared to an average of 1.2% for the remaining 86 
courts in the sample). The high concentration of cases from the Central Criminal Court is also 
reflected in an overrepresentation of serious offences in the sample, with the four most common 
offences captured being ¶PXUGHU·¶JULHYRXVERGLO\KDUP with intent· ¶DVVDXOWRFFDVLRQLQJDFWXDO
ERGLO\KDUP·, and ¶rape· (comprising 25.6%, 10.7%, 8.6%, and 8.4% of the sample).  
¶7KH /DZ 3DJHV· VXJJHVW on their website12 that their records are acquired from Her Majesty 
Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). This is confirmed by the inclusion of ¶&DVH1XPEHUs· - 
a unique identifier used by HMCTS for their internal management of trials13 - LQ¶7KH/DZ3DJHV·
records. Further reassurance regarding the validity of the data can be obtained from the 
academic research where this data has been used (Jacobson et al., 2016; Lavorgna, 2015; Pina-
Sánchez et al., 2018b).   
                                                          
12 See http://www.thelawpages.com/aboutus.php 
13 See http://xhibit.justice.gov.uk 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the sample used in the analysis 
 Mean/Proportion Range/N 
Sample Size  7221 
Judge id  1140 
Court id  86 
Dependent Variables   
Months in custody 126.4 (1, 540) 
Indeterminate sentence 0.286 (0, 1) 
Judge Characteristics   
Rotating judge 0.631 (0, 1) 
Staying judge 0.369 (0, 1) 
Female judge 0.087 (0, 1) 
Circuit judge 0.006 (0, 1) 
High Court judge 0.120 (0, 1) 
4XHHQ·V&RXQVHOMXGJH 0.296 (0, 1) 
Recorder 0.081 (0, 1) 
Defendant Characteristics   
Male defendant 0.940 (0, 1) 
Defendant·V age 33.9 (18, 92) 
Case Characteristics   
Year (centered) 1.58 (-4, 6) 
Co-defendants 0.360 (0, 1) 
Public protection sentence 0.294 (0, 1) 
Plead guilty before trial 0.499 (0, 1) 
Mitigating factors 0.090 (0, 1) 
Sentenced to remand 0.364 (0, 1) 
Victim impact statement 0.247 (0, 1) 
Injuries caused 0.177 (0, 1) 
Multiple offences 0.384 (0, 1) 
Specific Type of Offence    
Murder 0.256 (0, 1) 
Attempted murder 0.038 (0, 1) 
Grievous bodily harm with intent 0.107 (0, 1) 
Grievous bodily harm 0.050 (0, 1) 
Assault occasioning bodily harm 0.087 (0, 1) 
Common assault 0.029 (0, 1) 
Affray 0.019 (0, 1) 
Arson 0.017 (0, 1) 
Robbery 0.091 (0, 1) 
Kidnap 0.013 (0, 1) 
Rape 0.084 (0, 1) 
Rape of a child 0.017 (0, 1) 
Sex activity with a child 0.041 (0, 1) 
Sexual assault 0.060 (0, 1) 
Dangerous driving 0.035 (0, 1) 
Causing death by dangerous driving 0.047 (0, 1) 
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3. Analytical Strategy 
Two methodological challenges inform our analytic strategy: i) the correct specification of 
durations for indeterminate sentences (e.g. those offenders sentenced to life imprisonment), and 
ii) accounting for the non-hierarchical data structure with some judges operating across multiple 
courts. 
To include cases sentenced to indeterminate custody we use an accelerated-life Weibull model. 
This treats indeterminate sentences as right censored, with the ¶minimum term· duration being 
the last observed point of a potentially ongoing custodial spell. This specification was chosen in 
favour of an accelerated-life exponential model, the simplest type of parametric survival models, 
as it offered a better fit to the monotonically decreasing baseline hazard function observed in our 
sample of durations. The level-1 residual term, ߳, is therefore assumed to follow an extreme 
value distribution and scaled by the term భ೛. 7KH ¶VKDSH· SDUDPHWHU, ݌, is used to account for 
monotonically increasing (݌ ൐  ?) or decreasing (݌ ൏  ?) hazard rates, which the exponential 
model assumes to be constant.  
Existing attempts to account for the clustered structure of sentencing data have typically used 
hierarchical multilevel models, with the higher level used to account for either the clustering of 
sentences within specific judges, or within specific courts or geographic areas, depending on the 
data available. Johnson (2006) demonstrated how this approach may be flawed because it fails to 
correctly account for the nesting of sentences within specific judges and courts simultaneously, 
instead advocating the use of three-level models with sentences nested within specific judges, 
and judges in turn grouped in particular courts. Here we further extend this model by also 
allowing for judges who work across multiple courts. This type of cross-classification is 
represented in Fig. 1, which shows an excerpt of our data composed of seven sentences (S), two 
judges (J) and two courts (C). Notice how ܬଶ is perfectly nested within ܥଶ; contrast this with ܬଵ, 
who has passed sentences in both ܥଵ and ܥଶ.  
Fig. 1. Representation of the hierarchical structure of sentencing data in the Crown Court  
 
To account correctly for judges who work across multiple courts, we adopt a cross-classified 
multilevel specification (Fielding and Goldstein, 2006; Goldstein, 1994; Johnson, 2012; and 
Leckie, 2013). Specifically, we differentiate between clustering within courts and judges, while 
incorporating a complex error structure at the judge level that distinguishes between rotating 
judges (those that move between courts), and judges that only operate within a single court. 
Following the specification outlined in Brunton-Smith et al. (2012), this is achieved by specifying 
a random effect on the binary judge-level variable ௝ܼ that identifies whether a judge rotates 
across courts, ௝ܼ ൌ  ?, or operates within a single court, ௝ܼ ൌ  ?.  
The model takes the following form, ሺ ௜ܶሻ ൌ ߚ଴௜ ൅ ܠ௜ᇱ઺ ൅ ଵ௣ ߳௜              (1) ߚ଴௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߭ଵ௝ ൅ ߭଴௖  ௝ܼ ൌ  ?  ߚ଴௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߭ଶ௝ ൅ ߭଴௖  ௝ܼ ൌ  ?    
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ቂ߭ଵ௝߭ଶ௝ቃ  ?ܰሺ ?ǡ ȳሻǣȳ ൌ ቈߪజଵ௝ଶ ? ߪజଶ௝ଶ ቉ 
where ௜ܶ indicates the duration of the sentence, ߚ଴௜ is the intercept, ܠ௜ᇱ઺ is a vector including the 
full list of explanatory variables outlined in Table 1, and 
ଵ௣ ߳௜ is the scaled level-1 residual. In 
contrast with a standard cross-classified model, variability in the intercept, ߚ଴௜, is modelled  
separately for our two types of judge, with residual errors ߭ଵ௝ and ߭ଶ௝. These errors are assumed 
independent and identically distributed with mean zero, variances ߪజଵ௝ଶ  and ߪజଶ௝ଶ , and covariance 
constrained to zero to reflect the mutually exclusive judge categories. The random part of the 
model also includes a court-level random effect, ߭଴௖, with variance ߪజ଴௖ଶ Ǥ 
We specify two nested models and compare the size of their random effects. Model 1 is an 
empty model, with the random effects capturing gross sentencing disparities, i.e. disparities that 
could be due to either legal differences between cases or to unwarranted disparities. Model 2 
includes the full list of predictors, ܠ௜ᇱ઺, with the random part of the model now capturing the net 
disparities obtained after controlling for relevant case characteristics. One final model, Model 3, 
is estimated to explore the extent to which the observed net disparities at the judge level can be 
explained by the gender, or the title of the judge. 
As far as we are aware there are no mainstream statistical packages (commercial or open-source) 
that can be used to estimate the model suggested here. Hence, we resorted to the flexibility 
afforded by Bayesian statistics and the software WinBUGS (Lunn et al., 2000). We use diffuse 
prior distributions for all parameter estimates (see Appendix). Two separate MCMC chains are 
estimated with dispersed starting values, each with a burn-in of 15,000 and a monitoring period 
of 100,000 iterations. In the following section we report the posterior mean and 95% credible 
interval (denoted as 95% CI hereafter) for each parameter using the 170,000 monitoring 
iterations pooled across the two chains. The posterior mean and 95% CI are analogous to the 
point estimate and confidence interval produced by standard statistics packages in a non-
Bayesian setting. Visual inspection of the history plots and the Brooks-Gelman-Rubin 
convergence diagnostic (Brooks and Gelman, 1997) suggest the two chains have reached 
convergence and achieved good mixing. The posterior distributions are well approximated by the 
170,000 MCMC iterations as the Monte Carlo errors are below 5% of the corresponding 
posterior standard deviations for all parameters (Lunn et al., 2012). 
 
4. Results 
Looking first at the empty model (Model 1, Table 2) we can observe the presence of disparities 
in sentencing operating at both the court and judge level. Differences between judges are 
generally larger than differences between courts, highlighting the importance of correctly 
accounting for between-judge disparities in sentencing data analyses. When considering the two 
types of judge, greater disparities are evident between judges who rotate between courts (1.10) 
when compared against those judges who stayed within a single court (0.69). These ¶rotating· 
judges also tend to use harsher sentences, with a higher fixed effect estimate (5.94 compared to 
5.35 for judges that work in a single court). These results illustrate the need to go beyond the 
simpler multilevel models used previously, and justify the cross-classified model specified here. 
However, no substantive interpretation should be derived from these results since the model 
does not control for any relevant case characteristics. Consequently, results from Model 1 
conflate legitimate with unwarranted disparities in sentencing.   
Model 2 (Table 2) includes the equivalent parameter estimates for a model that includes the full 
set of offence and offender characteristics recorded in our sample. All of the explanatory 
variables included are statistically significant. Male defendants tend to receive longer sentences 
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than female defendants, so do older offenders, although the effect size is almost negligible. At 
the case-level our findings are consistent with the expected sentencing practice, with longer 
sentences awarded in cases when the defendant was sentenced for public protection or on 
remand, as well as cases including a victim statement, where injury was caused, or where the 
offence was part of a series. In contrast, shorter sentences were awarded when a guilty plea was 
entered, or where mitigating factors were noted. We also find evidence of a moderate increase in 
sentence length over time, which corroborates the increase in sentence severity documented in 
England and Wales over the last decade (Allen, 2016; Pina-Sánchez et al., 2019; Roberts and 
Ashworth, 2016; Roberts and Irwin-Rogers, 2015). The bottom part of the table captures the 
effect of different types of offences compared to cases of murder (the reference category), with 
all offence categories showing the expected negative effect.  
Turning to the random part of the model, and now having accounted for the full range of case 
characteristics, we observe disparities that are twice as large at the judge level than at the court 
level. This result illustrates how studies seeking to measure the inconsistency in sentencing using 
court disparities as a proxy (Drápal, 2018; Pina-Sánchez, 2015; Pina-Sánchez and Grech, 2015; 
Pina-Sánchez and Linacre, 2013; Pina-Sánchez et al. 2017, 2018; Tarling, 2006) are 
underestimating much of the problem by only being able to detect roughly one third of the total 
disparities. This result also suggests that the importance of court-level disparities may have been 
overplayed in existing literature (Ulmer, 2012), and questions the relevance of theories that have 
leaned on this concept in explaining the origin of disparities in sentencing, such as those focused 
on court culture. 
Redirecting our focus to the judge level estimates we observe that in Model 2 the typical 
sentence awarded by judges that rotate is almost identical to the sentence awarded by those that 
operate in a single court (11.85 and 11.77 respectively). Comparisons of these intercepts to those 
obtained in Model 1 suggests that ¶rotating· judges tend to sentence more serious cases, but once 
the features of the cases are considered, they do not seem to sentence more harshly than judges 
who stay in the single court. A more complex picture stems from the random effects observed 
for the different types of judges, with between-judge dispaULWLHV QRZ ORZHU DPRQJVW ¶URWDWLQJ·
judges (0.40 compared to 0.45 for judges that work in a single court). Therefore, judges who 
rotate across courts tend to deal with a more heterogeneous workload (as evidenced by the 
higher variance estimate in Model 1) but even in spite of that, tend to sentence more consistently 
than judges who stay in the same court when features of the case have been taken into 
consideration. This corroborates +HVWHU·V K\SRWKHVHVRQWKHEHQHILWVRIDOORZLQJMXGJHV
to rotate across different courts.  
One last model ² Model 3 ² is explored to assess whether the observed differences for judges 
who rotate across court are not confounded by other judge characteristics. We do not find 
evidence of VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVLQVHQWHQFLQJEDVHGRQWKHMXGJHV·JHQGHUBy contrast, judicial 
career stage appears to have an important effect on the relative severity of the punishment, with 
High Court judges (the most experienced) sentencing significantly more severely than any other 
type of judges. :KLOH WKLV PD\ EH D UHVXOW RI WKH ¶KDUGHQLQJ· GHVFULEHG E\ 6SRKQ E
whereby judges with more experience become more punitive over time, it might also be a 
product of the more serious cases that High Court judges are required to handle. In spite of 
controlling for the specific offence and other important case features, we cannot control for all 
the relevant case characteristics expected to increase the seriousness of a case. Importantly, we 
find that differencHV LQ WKH UDQGRPHIIHFWVEHWZHHQ ¶URWDWLQJ·DQG ¶VWD\LQJ· MXGJHVUHPDLQZLWK
the former showing lower disparities in sentencing. 
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Table 2. Results from Model 1, 2 and 3, where sentence length is specified using Weibull models 
and different set of explanatory variables; 95% CI within brackets. 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Random effects    
Std. dev. intercepts: court   0.43 (0.35, 0.53) 0.21 (0.16, 0.28) 0.20 (0.15, 0.27) 
Std. dev. intercepts: rotating judge 1.10 (1.00, 1.21) 0.40 (0.34, 0.47) 0.37 (0.32, 0.45) 
Std. dev. intercepts: staying judge 0.69 (0.61, 0.78) 0.45 (0.37, 0.53) 0.44 (0.36, 0.53) 
Fixed Effects    
Weibull slope 1.19 (1.16, 1.21) 2.03 (1.98, 2.08) 2.04 (1.99, 2.09) 
Intercept: rotating judge 5.94 (5.73, 6.15) 11.85 (11.51, 12.21) 11.70 (11.34, 12.09) 
Intercept: staying judge 5.35 (5.17, 5.53) 11.77 (11.44, 12.13) 11.70 (11.34, 12.08) 
Judge Characteristics (ref: male, unidentified title)    
Female judge   0.06 (-0.09, 0.22) 
Circuit judge   -0.40 (-0.79, 0.02) 
High Court judge   0.66 (0.45, 0.86) 
4XHHQ·V&RXQVHOMXGJH   -0.01 (-0.10, 0.08) 
Recorder   -0.33 (-0.44, -0.21) 
Defendant Characteristics (ref: female)    
Defendant male  0.39 (0.26, 0.52) 0.40 (0.27, 0.53) 
Defendant age  0.01 (0.01, 0.02) 0.01 (0.01, 0.02) 
Case Characteristics    
Year  0.04 (0.02, 0.05) 0.04 (0.02, 0.05) 
Co-defendants  0.26 (0.19, 0.34) 0.23 (0.16, 0.31) 
Public protection sentence  0.93 (0.82, 1.05) 0.89 (0.78, 1.06) 
Plead guilty before trial  -0.65 (-0.72, -0.59) -0.65 (-0.72, -0.58) 
Mitigating factors  -0.30 (-0.40, -0.20) -0.32 (-0.42, -0.22) 
Sentenced to remand  0.53 (0.45, 0.61) 0.52 (0.44, 0.60) 
Victim impact statement  0.30 (0.23, 0.38) 0.30 (0.22, 0.38) 
Injuries caused  0.11 (0.01, 0.22) 0.11 (0.01, 0.21) 
Second offence  0.66 (0.58, 0.74) 0.66 (0.58, 0.74) 
Third offence  0.43 (0.31, 0.54) 0.41 (0.30, 0.53) 
Fourth offence  0.54 (0.39, 0.69) 0.54 (0.39, 0.69) 
Offence type (ref: murder)    
Attempted murder  -2.30 (-2.56, -2.05) -2.26 (-2.52, -2.00) 
GBH with intent  -3.69 (-3.91, -3.48) -3.57 (-3.79, -3.36)  
GBH  -5.46 (-5.70, -5.22) -5.34 (-5.59, -5.11) 
ABH  -5.31 (-5.54, -5.09) -5.21 (-5.44, -4.98) 
Common assault  -6.03 (-6.31, -5.76) -5.93 (-6.20, -5.66) 
Affray  -6.37 (-6.66, -6.08) -6.22 (-6.51, -5.92) 
Arson  -4.42 (-4.70, -4.13) -4.31 (-4.60, -4.03) 
Robbery  -3.97 (-4.20, -3.75) -3.83 (-4.06, -3.60) 
Kidnap  -4.09 (-4.40, -3.77) -3.99 (-4.31, -3.67) 
Rape  -3.47 (-3.69, -3.25) -3.36 (-3.59, -3.14) 
Rape of a child under 13  -3.26 (-3.55, -2.98) -3.14 (-3.43, -2.85) 
Sex activity with a child  -4.27 (-4.52, -4.03) -4.15 (-4.40, -3.91) 
Sexual assault  -4.52 (-4.76, -4.28) -4.41 (-4.65, -4.17) 
Dangerous driving  -5.81 (-6.08, -5.55) -5.70 (-5.96, -5.44) 
Causing death by dangerous driving  -4.07 (-4.31, -3.84) -3.95 (-4.20, -3.72) 
Sample Size    
N sentences: 7221    
N rotating judges: 719    
N non-rotating judges: 421    
N courts: 86    
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5. Discussion 
In this study, we have employed innovative data scraping and text mining to extract relevant 
case-level, defendant, judge and court data from an online archive of sentence records from the 
England and Wales Crown Court. The dataset generated from this process was subsequently 
used to model prison sentence durations, investigate the presence of sentencing disparities, and 
identify whether those disparities are generated at the court or the judge level.  
The findings revealed that the disparities resulting from Crown Court locations are much less 
substantial than those stemming from the judge level. That is, it is not so much the location 
where the case is processed, but the judge presiding over the case within that location that will 
have the potential for providing an unduly lenient or harsh sentence. This central finding 
emphasizes the critical role that individual judges have in the sentencing process and lend 
support to previous calls for a better understanding of the impact these actors have on 
sentencing (Croyle, 1983; Divine, 2018; Long and Burnham, 2012; Ulmer, 2012; Yang, 2014, 
2015; Zatz, 2000). Important methodological and theoretical implications follow. 
From a methodological perspective, our findings suggest that studies limited to the analysis of 
between court disparities are missing much of the picture. We estimate that roughly two-thirds 
of the sentencing disparities pass unaccounted when the judge level is ignored. This calls into 
question the validity of most of the recent efforts aimed at estimating the level of consistency in 
the Crown Court (Pina-Sánchez, 2015; Pina-Sánchez and Grech, 2017; Pina-Sánchez and 
Linacre, 2013; Pina-Sánchez et al., 2017, 2018a), which have inevitably provided an incomplete 
view of the problem. This problem is expected to be even more pronounced in studies where 
measures of consistency are derived from disparities at a higher level than courts, such as 
counties (Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Haynes, 2011; Hester and Sevigny, 2016; Johnson, 2005; 
Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), districts (Feldmeyer and Ulmer, 2011; Hamilton, 2017; Johnson, et 
al., 2008; Kautt, 2002; Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2011; Ulmer and Johnson, 
2016), or police forces (Mason et al., 2007). Hence, affecting much of the empirical literature on 
the topic of consistency in sentencing. The more aggregate the units used to assess disparities the 
larger the extent of disparities taking place within them that will be missed. To borrow a 
PHWDSKRUPXFKRIWKHUHVHDUFKRQVHQWHQFLQJGLVSDULWLHVKDVRQO\EHHQDEOHWRREVHUYHWKH¶WLS
RIWKHLFHEHUJ· 
Theoretically, these findings suggest a relatively lesser role for court culture in explaining 
sentencing disparities than previously thought. This is in line with Church (1985), who has 
argued that court culture has a greater impact on court processes, such as court efficiency, than 
court outcomes, such as sentencing. Also in line with 8OPHU·VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHIRFal 
FRQFHUQV SHUVSHFWLYH WKH VRFLDO FRQWH[W XQGHUO\LQJ D FRXUW·V FXOWXUH seems to be only one of 
many non-legal FRQVLGHUDWLRQV WKDW MXGJH·V PD\ WDNH LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ ZKHQ PDNLQJ D
sentencing decision.  
It is also possible that the relevance of court cultures cannot be detected through the exploration 
of systematic disparities between courts. Perhaps the concept could be better operationalised by 
exploring disparities within courts. To do so it would be important to expand the approach 
undertaken here and seek to identify not only the judge but as many individual relevant actors 
operating within the same court (e.g. prosecutors, defence representatives). Such individual 
identifiers would allow to provide a measure of the influence of the concept of culture as a 
whole, and to explore how the specific interactions between those actors influence the final 
sentence outcome. In so doing, such research could further illuminate the work of Eisenstein, 
Flemming and Nardulli (1988), Flemming, Nardulli and Eisenstein (1992) and Eisenstein and 
Jacobs (1977), and their understanding of court cultures as complex phenomenon that arises 
from individual interactions within a workgroup.  
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Further investigations of between judge disparities in our dataset have provided some interesting 
insights into distinct sentencing practices within the Crown Court. Comparing the disparities 
resulting from judges who were observed to rotate across courts against those who stayed in the 
same court, we found that judges working in multiple courts sentence a more heterogeneous and 
complex caseload, but do so more consistently than judges who stay in the same court. These 
results corroborate Hester (2017), who, based on qualitative interviews with thirteen judges from 
South Carolina, indicates that judicial rotation seems to facilitate the spread of norms and 
homogenize judicial sentencing practices. Indeed, exposure to other judges and court actors may 
support consistent sentencing practices. 
This finding suggests that consistency in sentencing can be promoted using alternative ² or 
complimentary ² strategies to the design of sentencing guidelines. The introduction of guidelines 
have been historically met with considerable resistance from sentencers, as they can be perceived 
to undermine judicial autonomy (Sentencing Commission Working Group, 2008). Fostering 
judicial rotation, on the other hand, represent a less intrusive and prescriptive approach. As such, 
this approach to the promotion of consistency could simultaneously contribute to rebuild morale 
across the judiciary, which in England and Wales has been noted to be markedly low (Thomas, 
2017), and eliminate some of the negative side-effects that have been attributed to sentencing 
guidelines, such as the undermining of the principles of individualisation (Cooper, 2013) and 
proportionality (Alschuler, 1991; Lowenthal, 1993; Schulhofer, 1991).  
 
5.1. Beyond England and Wales 
In interpreting our findings, it is important to consider the peculiarities of the Crown Court, one 
of the Senior Courts in England and Wales, composed of highly experienced judges, dealing 
specifically with serious offences. Hence, it is worth considering whether the same results 
pointing at the importance of the judge over the location where the sentence was imposed can 
EH JHQHUDOLVHG WR RWKHU MXULVGLFWLRQ RU HYHQ WR WKH PDJLVWUDWH·V FRXUW D OHVV SURIHVVLRQDO DQG
more geographically dispersed group of courts processing the majority of offences in England 
and Wales. 
One major difference to be noted when considering the generisability of our findings to US 
jurisdictions, where most of the sentencing literature originates (Johnson et al., 2010), resides on 
the practice of electing judges. It could be expected that democratically elected judges, as 
opposed to those who are appointed, are held to account by the electorate directly and are 
perhaps more influenced by the public. If so, we should expect that between court disparities in 
the US play a bigger role than what we have noted here for the case of the England and Wales 
Crown Court. Another important difference stems from the practice of negotiated plea, 
commonly resorted to in the US but non-existent in England and Wales.  
Johnson (2006, 2014) studies of the State of Pennsylvania offer a great opportunity to carry out a 
comparative assessment since they are based on a relatively similar analytical strategy where judge 
and court (county in his case) levels where simultaneously modelled. The author found that for 
cases dealt as negotiated pleas most disparities stem from the area level, however, for those cases 
ending up in a trial most disparities originate at the judge level. In fact the ratio of judge/court 
disparities in the latter is more pronounced in Pennsylvania than what we have observed for the 
Crown Court. This comparison underlines the relevance of the warning we have raised in this 
study regarding the limitation of much of the literature studying sentencing disparities. Still, 
Pennsylvania is only one state within the US. The generisability of our findings could be further 
assessed using datasets from different jurisdictions, where judge and court (or area) identifiers 
have been obtained (Chatsverykova, 2017; Lim, 2016; Volkob, 2016; Yang, 2014). 
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5.2. A Final Note on the Need for Better Sentencing Data 
Progress in sentencing research has been stalled by data limitations. Collecting primary data14 is 
both expensive and time-consuming, with studies typically based on relatively small samples15 
that are restricted to one or a few courts (see Brown and Hullin, 1992; Davies and Tyrer, 2003; 
Dhami, 2005; Frazier and Bock, 1982; Hester, 2017; Jacobson and Hough, 2007). In most 
jurisdictions secondary data is published only at an aggregate level (e.g. number of prison 
sentences handed out per year). Certain jurisdictions have provided access to datasets composed 
of individual cases, but with the exception of Johnson (2006, 2014) such datasets are limited to a 
small number of courts (Anderson and Spohn, 2010; Fearn, 2005; Gruhl, Spohn, and Welch, 
1981; Johnson, 2005, 2012; Kautt, 2002; Kritzer and Uhlman, 1977; Spohn, 1990a, 1990b; 
Steffensmeier and Britt, 2001; Steffensmeier and Hebert, 1999; Uhlman, 1978; Welch et al., 
1988), while those offering wider coverage provide no judge identifiers (Drápal, 2018; Hamilton, 
2016; Pina-Sánchez and Linacre, 2013; Ulmer et al. 2011). 
Restrictions to the publication of sentencing records are often justified as a requirement to 
safeguard offenders· anonymity and comply with data protection acts16. Yet a review of some of 
the most commonly used sentencing datasets in the US and the UK (e.g. the Crown Court 
Sentencing Survey, the Court Proceedings Database from England and Wales17, or the United 
States Sentencing Commission, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, and the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines Commission in the US18) shows that it is details of the judge that are most 
often missing, with RIIHQGHUV·JHQGHUDJHand ethnic background generally provided. As noted 
in the introduction, we believe that the reasons are more likely to lie on the reluctance of the 
judiciary to release data that allows researchers to comment on their behaviour directly. 
These concerns reflect an important degree of misunderstanding on how sentencing data is used 
in social - non-doctrinal ² research, and seem unaware of recent developments in secure data 
sharing procedures. In the UK there are multiple examples of secure portals like the Ministry of 
Justice Data Lab, as well as repositories managing access of sensitive data like the UK Data 
Service. Other options that could be explored are robust data anonymisation techniques, such as 
those based on the incorporation of simulated errors (Biewen, Nolte and Rosemann, 2008). All 
of these approaches have been successfully applied to various other fields of research, and could 
be equally well applied to sentencing research. Furthermore, it is important to highlight how, for 
the most part, fears expressed by the judiciary are unfounded, and the above mentioned secure 
approaches unnecessary. Quantitative sentencing research seeks to detect and explain underlying 
broad patterns, its goal is not the study of specific cases or individuals. As a matter of fact, the 
identity of the judge or the location of the court are completely unnecessary, all that is needed is 
a way to tell them apart and in so doing be able to reproduce the hierarchical dimension 
observed in sentencing data. To do so numerical - or otherwise coded ² ¶ids· keeping no relation 
to the judge name or the court where they operate19, suffice. 
                                                          
14 Normally in the form of observations, file reviews, interviews, and questionnaires (including simulations) 
15 There are some important exceptions to this claim. See for example Myers and Talarico (1987) where the authors 
gathered over 27,720 offenders, or Hood (1992), who compiled a sample of 3,317 defendants. 
16 Such as the new General Data Protection Regulation in operation in the whole of the European Union since the 
25th-May-2018. 
17
 Available online here https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/analysis-and-research/crown-court-sentencing-
survey/record-level-data/ and here https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/criminal-justice-statistics. 
18
 Available online here https://www.ussc.gov/, here http://pcs.la.psu.edu/, and here https://mn.gov/sentencing-
guidelines/.  
19 This process should also be applied to record other actors that have been shown to influence sentencing decisions 
such as prosecutors and probation officers (Goulette et al., 2015; Leifker and Sample, 2011; Spohn et al., 2017; 
Sutton, 2013; Wooldredge, 2012). 
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We have shown how such a lack of judge id has limited the study of sentencing disparities in 
England and Wales, a central question in assessing the impact of their new sentencing guidelines. 
One would expect the judiciary to be the first interested party in understanding the impact that 
such process of reform has had on sentencing practice, which makes it difficult to comprehend 
their reticence towards the disclosing of sentencing records. Yet, the implications of this 
problem extends beyond the study of sentencing disparities, or the jurisdiction of England and 
Wales. The incorrect assumption of sentencing data being independently distributed leads to 
biased estimations of standard errors and other measures of uncertainty (Dhami and Belton, 
2016; Johnson, 2006). With almost all quantitative research in the field failing to account for 
clustering at the court and judge level simultaneously, we should expect this problem to be 
ubiquitous. 
The growing availability of administrative data (Connelly et al., 2016) has made it possible for us 
to circumvent the limitations of official data, and to generate a new dataset reconstructing the 
main features of a sample of cases sentenced in the Crown Court, including the identity of the 
judge and the location of the court. We believe the application of a similar research design in 
some of the US jurisdictions offers a great opportunity to overcome some of the key issues that 
have affected sentencing research in that country. Official State and Federal sentencing records 
do not offer adequately fine grained distinctions between cases, leading to problems of omitted 
relevant variable bias (Baumer, 2013; Ulmer, 2012). Using sentence transcripts and text mining 
techniques new sentencing datasets could be created aiming at capturing the presence of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, key case characteristics that have been commonly missed in 
most sentencing research in the US. 
Recent developments undertaken at the Finish Ministry of Justice (Frosterus et al., 2014; 
Oksanen et al., 2017) demonstrate how advanced natural language processing algorithms can be 
used to generate more detailed sentencing datasets than the one we have generated here. The 
same process could be replicated in England and Wales - and elsewhere ² if the judiciary decides 
to provide access to their court records. This is clearly in their own interest since not only would 
it generate new datasets with which to carry out more robust sentencing research, but it would 
also eliminate the need for expensive court surveys, such as those currently commissioned by the 
Sentencing Council for England and Wales to assess the impact of their guidelines.  
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Appendix. WinBUGS Code 
model{ 
#Model (accelerated-life Weibull models with a complex error structure to account for court-judge cross-classification) 
for(i in 1:7221) { 
months[i] ~ dweib(shape,mu[i])I(cens[i],) 
log(mu[i]) <- -(b01[judge[i]]*rotate[i] + b02[judge[i]]*stay[i] + b2[court[i]] + A[i] + B[i]) 
A[i] <- b3*d.male[i] + b4*d.age[i] + b5*codef[i] + b6*protection[i] + b7*onplea[i] + b8*miti[i] +  
            b9*remand[i] + b10*off2[i] + b11*off3[i] + b12*off4[i] + b13*victimpct[i] + b14*injuries[i] +  
            b15*circuit[i] + b16*HighCourt[i] + b17*QC[i] + b18*recorder[i] + b19*j.male[i] +  
B[i] <- b20*ABH[i] + b21*attempted[i] + b22*GBH[i] + b23*affray[i] + b24*common[i] +  
            b25*intent[i] + b26*arson[i] + b27*robbery[i] + b28*kidnap[i] + b29*rape[i] + b30*sexchild[i] +    
            b31*sexaslt[i] + b32*rapechild[i] + b33*dangedrive[i] + b34*dthdngdrv[i] + b35*yearcntrd[i]  
} 
 
#Random effects 
#Court 
for(j in 1:86){ 
b2[j] ~ dnorm(0,tau.2) 
} 
#Rotating judges 
for(l in 1:1140){ 
beta01[l] ~ dnorm(b01,tau.01) 
} 
#Staying judges 
for(k in 1:1140){ 
beta02[k] ~ dnorm(b02,tau.02) 
} 
 
#Priors 
shape ~ dgamma(1,.001) 
b01 ~ dnorm(0,0.001) 
b02 ~ dnorm(0,0.001) 
b3 ~ dnorm(0,0.001) 
« 
B35 ~ dnorm(0,0.001) 
#Hyperpriors 
tau.2 ~ dgamma(0.001,0.001)  
tau.01 ~ dgamma(0.001,0.001)  
tau.02 ~ dgamma(0.001,0.001)  
} 
